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Since 1993, more than half of all registeredIncident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)) cases of theft of nuclear and other radioactive material occurred during authorized transport, with this figure rising to nearly 70% over the past decade. New data, published today by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), highlight the need for continued vigilance in nuclear security during transport.

Of the 4,626 incidents recorded in the ITDB between 1993 and 2025, 730 involved the theft of radioactive material, including attempted thefts. Of these, nearly 55% occurred during transport, and in more than 59% of those cases—approximately 400 incidents—the stolen radioactive material was never recovered.

"Nuclear and other radioactive material remains vulnerable to nuclear security threats during transport, and, based on the ITDB, nuclear security needs to be systematically strengthened," said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Security. "The IAEA, upon request, assists countries in strengthening their national nuclear security regimes to ensure the safe handling of such material and its full protection from criminal or intentional unauthorized acts during transport."

The ITDB is the IAEA's information system that stores data on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities, as well as events involving nuclear and other radioactive material outside regulatory control. While most incidents are not related to illicit trafficking or malicious intent, their occurrence highlights unresolved issues in transport security, regulatory controls, disposal practices, and detection.

In 2025, 34 of the 145 ITDB member states reported 263 incidents. This figure is higher than the 147 incidents reported in 2024, but this increase is due to retrospective reporting.

The ITDB covers all types of nuclear material—including uranium, plutonium, and thorium—as well as natural and artificial radioisotopes and radioactively contaminated material found in scrap metal. The ITDB continues to report incidents at scrap metal recycling facilities involving industrial goods contaminated with radioactive material. This demonstrates that for some countries, ensuring the physical security of disused radioactive sources and detecting cases of their unauthorized disposal remains a pressing issue.

The ITDB fact sheet is being released to coincide with this week's event. International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive MaterialsAccording to the IAEA, millions of shipments of nuclear and other radioactive materials are transported annually for peaceful purposes in energy, medicine, education, agriculture, and industry.

The conference provides a forum for representatives of the international shipping system to discuss the opportunities, challenges, and key factors facilitating the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material while respecting nuclear safety and security requirements. The conference will address legal and regulatory aspects, transport packaging design, operations, trade and logistics considerations, and innovative technologies that could impact nuclear and physical safety of transportation.

Information about ITDB

The ITDB facilitates the international exchange of information on incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material no longer subject to regulatory control due to loss, theft, improper disposal, or other negligent handling. The database also includes reports of material being transferred under regulatory control through various means, including the discovery of orphan radioactive sources at scrap metal recycling facilities. Data is provided to the ITDB on a voluntary basis, and full access is available only to participating states, with limited access available to international organizations such as the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the World Customs Organization (WCO).

The ITDB contains information on incidents involving nuclear material, radioisotopes, and radioactively contaminated material. By reporting lost or stolen material to the ITDB, countries increase the chances of its recovery and reduce the likelihood of its use in criminal activities. States can also report acts of fraud or deception involving information allegedly related to the presence of nuclear or other radioactive material.

States wishing to become participants in the ITDB should submit a request to the IAEA through official channels (i.e., their permanent mission, the ministry of foreign affairs, or the national nuclear security authority).

Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source. It represents an accurate account of the source's assertions and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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How is the safety and security of radioactive material ensured during transportation?

What's what in the nuclear sphere?

Radioactive materials, if improperly handled, can be hazardous to people and the environment, and their transportation requires careful planning.

March 26, 2026

Anna Storch, IAEA Office of Public Information and Communication

Illustration: M. Magnaye/IAEA

Every year, millions of shipments of radioactive materials are transported by land, air, and sea. These materials are essential for medicine, industry, scientific research, agriculture, and energy production. Because radioactive materials, if improperly handled, can pose a danger to people and the environment, their transportation requires careful planning based on compliance with international nuclear safety standards and physical security measures.

For what purpose is radioactive material transported?

Radioactive materials are used in many activities that improve the lives of people all over the planet. Because these materials are produced only by a limited number of specialized facilities, ensuring their safety and security during transport is crucial to ensure they can be used wherever needed.

In medicine, variousradioisotopesThey are used to diagnose and treat cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and bone lesions, perform radiation therapy procedures, and sterilize medical instruments. The regular delivery of these radioactive materials to medical facilities accounts for the majority of all radioactive material shipments worldwide and is crucial to global public health. Successful scientific research is impossible without the supply of radioactive material to universities, laboratories, and research institutes. Short-lived radionuclides are needed for experiments in physics, biology, and environmental sciences, while gamma radiation sources are used to study the effects of radiation on cells, tissues, and industrial materials, as well as forensuring the preservation of cultural artifactsIn industrial sectors such as construction, energy, mining, and manufacturing, radioactive materials are essential for non-destructive testing and inspection of pipelines, machinery, and structural components. Some high-tech industries, such as electronics and mechanical engineering, require the transportation of naturally occurring radioactive raw materials to extract valuable non-radioactive metals such as titanium, niobium, tantalum, and rare earth elements. A prerequisite for the stable generation of low-carbon energy at nuclear power plants is the transportation of uranium, plutonium, and other radioactive materials at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle—from production to spent fuel management. Waste and spent components from nuclear installations also require transportation to specialized processing and disposal facilities. Radioisotopes are transported for agricultural purposes and to ensure food safety. They help increase crop yields, optimize fertilizer use, and are also used forfood irradiationin order to destroy harmful bacteria.

Regardless of the application, radioactive material is transported under strict nuclear and physical safety measures to ensure the protection of people and the environment from harmful effects.ionizing radiation, and also to prevent accidents and malicious actions.

How is radioactive material transported?

What types of transport are used to transport radioactive material?

Depending on the availability of transport and the urgency of delivery, radioactive material may be transported by land, water, or air. Each mode of transport requires specific procedures for loading, unloading, and sealing the material.

Land transport carries packages classified according to the type of radioactive material being transported. Sea transport is used for large-tonnage international shipments, with packages securely stowed on ships in accordance with maritime safety regulations. Air transport is often chosen when time is of the essence, such as for the delivery of medical isotopes.

Who is involved in the transportation of radioactive material?

Transporting radioactive material requires close cooperation between many parties.

Shippers, carriers, and consignees ensure compliance with physical security measures during transportation to prevent unauthorized access to radioactive material during transit. These parties jointly ensure the safety and security of the radioactive material being transported.

Illustration: M. Magnaye/IAEA

What regulations govern the transportation of radioactive material?

The transport of radioactive material is regulated by a set of international regulations applicable to all modes of transport—road, rail, sea, and air. These regulations define the packaging, labeling, documentation, and handling of materials to protect people and the environment.

The rules establish clear requirements regarding:

Sealing to prevent leaks and radioactive contamination; protection to limit radiation doses to transport workers and the public; resistance to heat generated by the radioactive material itself or generated by external causes; prevention of any nuclear chain reaction in fissile materials during transport.

These regulations also establish requirements for the design and testing of packaging; the adoption of safety measures during loading, securing, and placing packages at a safe distance from each other during transportation; and the training of personnel involved in transportation and the practice of emergency preparedness measures.

National authorities are incorporating these global security principles into their legislation to ensure that shipments meet the same strict standards, regardless of their destination. This consistent approach allows radioactive material to be transported safely and securely across national borders using various modes of transport.

How is safety ensured during transportation?

By adhering to the strictest standards at every stage of transport operations, countries help ensure that these vital materials reach their destination safely and securely. These operations and control measures include proper loading and unloading, segregation, stowage, and radiation monitoring during loading, transport, and unloading.

Photo: IAEA

Safe packaging for transporting radioactive material

Packaging plays a central role in the safe transport of radioactive material. It is designed and rigorously tested to limit radiation exposure and prevent any leakage of radioactive material under normal conditions or, for certain types of material, as a result of accidents such as falls, fires, or immersion in water.

The packaging design varies depending on the radioactivity and type of contents, with a differentiated approach being applied: the higher the potential hazard, the more powerful the protection.

Types of packaging for radioactive materials

Excepted packaging is used for very small quantities of radioactive material that pose minimal risk during transport. This packaging is safe, but due to the very low radiation levels, some of the more detailed labeling and documentation requirements applicable to higher-risk cargo do not apply.

Examples of materials transported in excepted packages include: laboratory instruments, small laboratory samples, smoke alarms, small calibration sources, small closedsources.

Industrial packaging is designed to ensure adequate levels of safety during the transportation of low specific activity (LSA) material and objects with surface radioactive contamination (OSRC).

LNA material is a radioactive material that, by its nature, has a low activity per unit mass: the distribution of radioactive material in the substance is so large that it does not pose a significant hazard.

An OPZ is a solid object that is not radioactive in itself, but has a contaminated surface.

Examples of materials transported in industrial packaging: uranium ore concentrate (yellow cake), radioactive waste.

Type A packages are intended for the safe transport of radioactive material posing a negligible radiological risk. They are designed to ensure containment and protection of the contents under normal transport conditions, including minor incidents.

Examples of materials transported in Type A packages:radiopharmaceuticals, used in medical imaging, fresh nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants.

Type B packages are designed to transport higher-level radioactive material. They are constructed to withstand severe accidents while ensuring safety.

Examples of materials transported in Type B packages include spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors being transferred to long-term storage facilities or reprocessing plants, and gamma cameras for radiographic inspection.

Type C packages are specifically designed for the air transport of very high-level radioactive material, which, if released during an accident, could cause severe radiation exposure. Type C packages provide the highest level of protection in the event of an accident.

Examples of materials transported in Type C packages include: high-level radioactive materials (including plutonium) used in medicine, industry and scientific research.

Certain materials, such as uranium hexafluoride or fissile materials (e.g., uranium-233, uranium-235, plutonium-239, and plutonium-241), require additional safety precautions due to their chemical properties (e.g., if the material is also flammable or corrosive) or an increased risk of criticality. Unlike most radioactive materials, some fissile materials, when present in the wrong quantity or configuration, can achieve criticality and cause a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Because of this increased risk of chain reaction, additional precautions must be taken during design and operational control to prevent such conditions from occurring during transport.

Read more about uranium Here.

How is the safety of radioactive material ensured during transportation?

While nuclear safety measures aim to prevent accidents and radiation exposure, physical security measures during transport are aimed at protecting radioactive material from unauthorized access and malicious actions such as theft or sabotage.

Physical security measures during transportation are also based on a differentiated approach: they are adopted based on the risk level and take into account the quantity and physical and chemical properties of the radioactive material, its packaging, and the mode of transport. Physical security measures are aimed at promptly identifying potential threats, preventing malicious actions by creating obstacles, and training security personnel to effectively respond to neutralize the threat and mitigate damage.

Physical security measures may include route planning, secure storage during stops, personnel background checks, communication protocols, and real-time cargo tracking. Ensuring physical security also requires collaboration between transport operators, government agencies, and border authorities. Adopting physical security measures alongside nuclear safety measures ensures the protection of radioactive material at all stages of transportation.

Illustration: M. Magnaye/IAEA

What to do if an emergency occurs during the transportation of radioactive material?

Although accidents involving the transport of radioactive material are extremely rare, emergency preparedness and response are essential. Measures are taken to ensure that even in the event of an unexpected situation, people and the environment remain protected.

Ensuring readiness

Before transporting any shipment of radioactive material, emergency response plans are developed based on the risk level. These plans are based on a graded approach, meaning that the level of preparedness is proportionate to the potential hazard. Shippers and carriers must develop emergency response procedures and conduct regular briefings, drills, and exercises to ensure all parties are familiar with the procedures to follow in the event of an incident.

Collaboration

Effective emergency response is impossible without coordination. Shippers, carriers, local emergency services, and government agencies work together, fulfilling clearly defined roles within the national emergency response system. Communication and decision-making are organized to ensure actions across regions and modes of transportation are carried out quickly and safely.

Incident response

If an incident occurs during the transportation of radioactive material, the primary responsibility of emergency response services is to take prompt action to protect people and the environment. The first priority is to neutralize all radiological hazards by monitoring radiation levels, preventing the spread of contamination, and securing damaged packages. Response measures are initiated when there are clear signs of danger, such as elevated radiation levels or visible damage to the packages. The emergency response system provides qualified radiation protection specialists who can advise and assist in the safe and secure recovery of the material.

The application of strict IAEA safety standards and nuclear security guidance, coupled with effective international cooperation, enables the transport of radioactive material worldwide for medical, scientific, industrial, and energy purposes while ensuring the safety of people and the environment.

What is the role of the IAEA?

The IAEA develops and maintains safety standards and guidance on nuclear security and helps countries develop and implement robust national nuclear safety and security regimes governing the transport of radioactive material. Since 1961, the IAEA has enacted and periodically updatedRules for the safe transportation of radioactive materialsThese regulations are adopted worldwide and apply to all modes of transport. The IAEA provides countries, institutional and industrial stakeholders, and the general public with the necessary information and serves as a forum for them to discuss issues related to the transport of radioactive material, for example, within the framework of International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive MaterialIn March 2026, the IAEA will organize courses and training on the transport of radioactive material in compliance with nuclear safety and security requirements at its e-learning platform.
Incident and Emergency CenterThe IAEA serves as the global focal point for coordinating international preparedness, communication, and response to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies. The IAEA helps resolve transport issues, including delays or denials of shipments of radioactive material due to complex regulations, radiation concerns, knowledge gaps, public demand, or logistical constraints. The IAEA promotes cooperation and regulatory harmonization, provides training, and builds national capacity. The IAEA also maintains an up-to-date inventory national coordinatorsAndcompetent authorities.

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Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source. It represents an accurate account of the source's assertions and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency –

An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) relied solely on its recently repaired backup power line for several hours earlier this month, following scheduled maintenance that required the intentional disconnection of its main power line for several hours. The backup power line had only just been restored the previous day, further emphasizing the continued fragility of nuclear safety conditions amid the conflict, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

According to the IAEA team based at the ZNPP, the plant's main power connection was temporarily suspended on March 6 to perform essential maintenance work. During this period, the 330 kV Ferosplavna-1 backup line – successfully restored on 5 March 2026 under afifth local ceasefirenegotiated by the IAEA – maintained a stable supply of off-site power to the ZNPP.

"The ZNPP's fragility in the face of limited off-site power options is putting constraints on electrical maintenance. It is another indication of the critical importance of robust, diverse and dependable off-site power infrastructure to ensure nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP," Director General Grossi said.

Separately, during the past two weeks, the IAEA team at the ZNPP held a meeting regarding the plant's updated organizational structure introduced in 2025. They discussed the updated reporting lines, responsibilities and the departments that were merged.

The team also observed the testing of an emergency diesel generator (EDG) at Unit 3. EDGs provide essential backup power support in case a nuclear power plant (NPP) was to lose access to all off-site electricity, something which has happened twelve times at the ZNPP since the start of the conflict. The team also engaged in discussions focusing on the 2026 maintenance plan and fire protection systems and observed a partial evacuation drill involving personnel in the administrative building.

The State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) informed the IAEA that during the night of 11-12 March, attacks targeting and destroying an electrical substation close to the subcritical Neutron Source Installation at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) resulted in its disconnection from the electrical grid until 13 March. During this outage, the facility relied on EDGs.

Elsewhere in Ukraine, the IAEA team at the Chornobyl NPP reported that on March 14, the site was disconnected from its 750 kV Kyivska transmission line for nearly 24 hours. The SNRIU informed the IAEA that the cause of the disconnection was an attack targeting an electrical substance essential to nuclear safety and security. Although off-site power to the plant was not lost, this disconnection and subsequent fluctuations in the electrical grid automatically activated the EDGs supplying the New Safe Confinement and Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility 1. The generators were manually switched off after 15 minutes.

“These episodes underscore how grid instability and the vulnerability of off-site power is affecting nuclear safety and security at Ukraine's nuclear facilities,” Director General Grossi said.

Additionally, the IAEA team at the South Ukraine NPP reported that a drone was detected one kilometer from the site on 18 March, following sightings of two drones, detected approximately five kilometers from the site during the night of 6 to 7 March 2026.

Over the past two weeks, the Agency has continued with deliveries under its comprehensive program of assistance to Ukraine in nuclear safety and security. Helmets and body armor have been delivered to the KIPT National Science Center, enhancing personal protection measures at the site. Beds and mattresses were provided to the Chornobyl NPP to improve staff living conditions under the medical assistance initiative. A high precision electrometer for radiation dosimetry was delivered to the National Scientific Center “Institute of Metrology” and telemechanic cabinets were delivered to the Joint Stock Company “Mykolaivoblenergo”.

Within the framework of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to the Kherson Oblast (ISAMKO), advanced IT and laboratory equipment was provided to the Odesa Regional State Laboratory and two state-of-the-art gas chromatographs have been supplied to the Vinnytsia Regional State Laboratory and the Ternopil Regional State Laboratory.

The deliveries were supported with funding from Italy, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source. It represents an accurate account of the source's assertions and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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Source: International Atomic Energy Agency –

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Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) was successfully reconnected to a back-up power line, following repairs carried out under the protection of thefifth local ceasefire negotiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

The 330 kilovolt (kV) Ferosplavna-1 off-site power line was reconnected and restored to the ZNPP at 17:33 local time on Thursday. For 23 days, the ZNPP solely relied on the 750 kV Dniprovska off‑site power line to sustain all essential nuclear safety functions. Before the conflict, the ZNPP had four 750 kV and six 330 kV power lines available.

“The restoration of the additional off-site power line strengthens nuclear safety and security,” Director General Grossi said. The Ferosplavna-1 power line wasdisconnected on February 10, reported as a result of military activity at the switchyard operated by the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP).

Preparatory works, including de-mining activities, first took place last week on 27 and 28 February. Following this necessary step, the IAEA team at the ZNPP was able to visit the switchyard and observe damage to various electrical components such as breakers, disconnectors, current transformers and cable segments. Monitored daily by the IAEA team, the repairs were completed on Thursday, after the systematic replacement or refurbishment of key components reusing other parts of the switchyard.

“Off-site power lines to the ZNPP were disconnected on multiple occasions over the past three months, including two total losses of off-site power, bringing the total to 12 since the start of the war,” Director General Grossi said. “These repeated outages underline the importance of maintaining secure off-site power under theFive Principles.”

The Ferosplavna‑1 power line normally delivers back-up electricity to the ZNPP from the ZTPP switchyard through two separate lines. Recent damage to key components in the 330 kV switchyard prevented the restoration of both of these lines, therefore repair efforts were focused on restoring the line that connects the 330 kV ZTPP switchyard to the ZNPP autotransformer in the 750 kV switchyard — a line previously repaired under an IAEA‑negotiated ceasefire in December 2025.

This work has now re‑established the Ferosplavna‑1 line as a source of back-up power for the ZNPP, however with reduced independence in the plant's back-up power options. The IAEA will work closely with the ZNPP to identify a solution for full restoration of the back-up power source.

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Uranium is a naturally occurring radioactive element, which has the atomic number of 92 and corresponds to the chemical symbol U in the periodic table. It belongs to a special group of elements called “actinides” — elements that were discovered relatively late in history.

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IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi delivers a statement to the Board of Governors at the Agency's Headquarters in Vienna, Austria, 2 March 2026. Photo: D. Calma/IAEA

(Prepared for presentation at a Council meeting)

We are all following with concern the military strikes in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Middle East.

The Agency immediately took action within its mandate, focusing on the potential for military-induced radiological emergencies.

In this regard, the IAEA's Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) is involved, with a dedicated team collecting information and assessing the situation despite the restrictions imposed by the conflict.

The regional security monitoring network has been put on alert and is in constant communication with us. Currently, no increase in radiation levels above normal background levels has been recorded in countries bordering Iran.

Regarding the status of nuclear facilities in Iran, at this time we have no information that any nuclear facilities, including the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the Tehran Research Reactor or other nuclear fuel cycle facilities, have been damaged or hit.

The IAC continues to attempt to establish contact with Iranian nuclear regulatory authorities, but has not yet received a response. We hope that this crucial channel of communication will be restored as soon as possible.

Iran and many other countries in the region that have been subjected to military strikes operate nuclear power plants and research reactors, along with associated fuel storage sites, increasing nuclear safety risks. The United Arab Emirates operates four nuclear reactors, while Jordan and Syria operate research reactors. Bahrain, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia have also been subjected to strikes. All of these countries utilize nuclear technology to varying degrees. Therefore, we urge maximum restraint in any military operations.

In accordance with the objectives of the IAEA, as enshrined in its Statute, I again call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation.

Let me once again recall the General Conference resolutions of previous years, which state that armed attacks on nuclear installations are unacceptable and can lead to radioactive releases with serious consequences both within and beyond the borders of the State that is attacked.

To ensure long-term assurances that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons and to maintain the effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime, we must return to diplomacy and negotiation.

The Agency will continue to monitor the situation, drawing on its unique resources, extensive experience, and extensive international network. We will report any radiological consequences of the ongoing military actions and stand ready to provide advice and support to our Member States should threats to nuclear safety and security arise.

As you know, I am directly involved in supporting efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the impasse surrounding Iran's nuclear program. The negotiators invited me to the last two rounds of consultations in Geneva, where I provided impartial and technical advice from the IAEA.

However, this time the parties failed to reach an understanding. I believe we are all, understandably, deeply disappointed.

The use of force has accompanied international relations since time immemorial. It's a reality. However, this path is the least desirable of all.

I remain convinced that a lasting resolution to these long-standing disagreements is only possible at the diplomatic negotiating table. The IAEA stands ready to make its indispensable contribution immediately, wherever needed.

When it comes to nuclear issues, it is crucial to have a clear understanding of the scope and verifiability of the relevant agreement.

Diplomacy is a complex process, but there are no hopeless situations. Nuclear diplomacy presents even greater challenges, but even in this area, solutions can be found.

The question is not whether we will meet again at the negotiating table, but when it will happen – and we simply must do it as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman, Your Excellencies,

In conclusion, let me reiterate that I am in close contact with Member States in the region affected by the current situation. The IAEA has a comprehensive understanding of the nature and location of nuclear and radiological materials in the region, and we have clear guidance on how to respond to a radiological release following an attack or accident, as well as the ability to provide practical assistance if needed. Let me emphasize that the current situation is of grave concern. We cannot rule out the possibility of a radiological release with serious consequences, including the need to evacuate areas comparable in size to, or even larger than, major cities. I can assure you that the IAEA is actively engaged, engaging with Member States, and keeping the international community informed, remaining prepared to respond immediately in the event of a nuclear security breach.

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The fifth local ceasefire negotiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) between Ukraine and the Russian Federation commenced today, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi confirmed. The temporary ceasefire enables the restoration of the off-site back-up power supply to Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

“I appreciate both the Russian Federation and Ukraine for their constructive engagement in agreeing to another localized ceasefire,” Director General Grossi said. “It paves the way for repairs to strengthen the site's off-site power in our efforts to maintain nuclear safety and security at ZNPP.”

The IAEA has previously facilitated four temporary ceasefire agreements, which allowed five separate repairs to power lines connected to the ZNPP.

Preparatory works, including de-mining activities, began today at the 330 kV switchyard of the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP), through which back-up power is provided to the ZNPP. After one to two days of preparatory work, technicians will assess and initiate repairs in the presence of the IAEA team based at the ZNPP.

ZNPP's Ferosplavna-1 330 kV back-up off-site power linewas disconnected on 10 February, reported as a result of military activity. Since then, ZNPP has been solely powered by the 750 kV Dniprovska off-site power line to ensure nuclear safety and security functions. Last week, the Ferosplavna-1 power line was successfully energized. However, repairs are needed so that power can be supplied to the switchyard and then onto the ZNPP.

“The IAEA has once again demonstrated our essential role to minimize the risk of a nuclear accident during this war, and we will continue to do so for as long as it takes,” Director General Grossi said. “Once again, I remind both sides of the need to abide by theFive Concrete Principles to prevent an accident at the ZNPP.”

Over the past week, the IAEA team based at the ZNPP reported hearing military activities each day, including a number of explosions in close proximity to the ZNPP.

Additionally, on Thursday, military activity once again affected the Ukrainian electrical substances essential for maintaining nuclear safety and security, impacting operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) across Ukraine. Two NPPs were disconnected from one off-site power line each, and two NPPs were also required to reduce operating power. At the Chornobyl NPP site, one off-site power line was also disconnected, and an emergency diesel generator of the New Safe Confinement (NSC) automatically started as a result of electrical fluctuations. There was not a total loss of off-site power to the NSC, according to the IAEA team at the site.

Nine drones were detected within the Chornobyl NPP site monitoring area on Wednesday night and one on Thursday night, while three drones were detected 12 kilometers from the South Ukraine NPP on Wednesday night. One missile was also observed within the South Ukraine NPP monitoring area on Sunday night.

The IAEA continued with deliveries under its comprehensive assistance program for Ukraine amid the on-going conflict, now entering its fifth year. One liquid chromatography tandem mass spectrometer was delivered to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional State Laboratory to assist in the analysis of environmental samples. A utility cart for Quantulus GCT liquid scintillation counter was delivered to the Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Center of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine. The deliveries were made possible with funds from Japan and Sweden.

Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source. It represents an accurate account of the source's assertions and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency –

An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is operating on its sole remaining main power line after losing its only back‑up line more than a week ago. The situation underscores the plant's continued vulnerability and the persistent risks to nuclear safety amid the conflict, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi warned today.

ZNPP's Ferosplavna-1 330 kV back-up off-site power line was disconnected on 10 February, reported as a result of military activity near the 330 kV switchyard operated by the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP). Despite this loss, the plant continues to rely on the 750 kV Dniprovska off‑site power line, which is currently sustaining all essential nuclear safety functions.

The IAEA team stationed at the ZNPP continues to request detailed information on the nature and extent of the damage. The team has also sought access to the site's switchyard to observe and assess any potential impact first-hand. However, access to this area has been denied to the Agency's teams for several years due to security restrictions.

“The IAEA stands ready to accurately report on the nature of the damage and any impact on nuclear safety and security,” said Director General Grossi.

While the timeframe for implementing the necessary repairs remains unknown, Director General Grossi confirmed that the IAEA has reached out to both sides with a proposed ceasefire window to enable safe assessment and repair of the damage. The Agency has previously facilitated four temporary ceasefire agreements, which allowed five separate repairs to power lines connected to the ZNPP.

“Reliable off‑site power is fundamental to maintaining nuclear safety and security, as set out in both the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars as well as the Five Principles to avoid a nuclear accident at the ZNPP" said Director General Grossi. “The Agency remains fully committed to supporting all necessary efforts to ensure the safe and secure operation of every nuclear facility in Ukraine.”

Additionally, this week across Ukraine, IAEA teams at the Rivne and Khmelnitsky nuclear power plants (NPPs) reported having to take shelter several times. At the Chornobyl site, the IAEA team was informed of nine drones within the monitoring area, while at the Khmelnitsky NPP one drone was detected approximately four kilometers from the plant. The teams also reported that one operating NPP temporarily lost an off‑site power line for less than a day.

The IAEA marked a significant milestone in its comprehensive assistance program for Ukraine this month, completing its 200th delivery of equipment and support to help maintain nuclear safety and security amid the ongoing conflict. This week, under the medical assistance program, 244 tables and 263 wardrobes were delivered to the Chornobyl NPP to improve staff living conditions. The delivery – the 204th in the assistance program – was funded by Austria and Norway.

“The IAEA has been responding to Ukraine's requests for assistance since early on in conflict,” said Director General Grossi. “Reaching 200 deliveries is a clear demonstration of the Agency's unwavering commitment to supporting nuclear safety and security across the country.”

Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source. It represents an accurate account of the source's assertions and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency –

An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

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What are radioactive sources?

What's what in the nuclear sphere?

Radioactive sources are used to kill bacteria in food, sterilize medical devices and equipment, treat cancer and other diseases, map groundwater sources, test the integrity of mechanical structures, and measure soil density for construction projects.

February 20, 2026

Joanne Liu, Bureau of Public Information and Communications

Radioactive sources like the one pictured are used in a variety of fields, including medicine, agriculture, industry, scientific research, and education. Their size ranges from a few millimeters to several centimeters.

Radioactive sources contain radioactive material, which in turn contains certain radionuclides (unstable forms of a chemical element that emit radiation), the choice of which varies depending on the intended use of the source. These sources emit ionizing radiation, typically in the form of alpha and beta particles, gamma rays, or neutron radiation.

Until the 1950s, it was only possible to use naturally occurring radionuclides, such as radium-226—this isotope of radium is used in the treatment of certain types of cancer. Today, artificial radionuclides produced in nuclear facilities and accelerators are widely used, including cesium-137, cobalt-60, and iridium-192. These radioactive sources are used worldwide for medical, industrial, agricultural, research, and educational purposes.

For example, radioactive sources are used to kill bacteria in food, sterilize medical devices and equipment, treat cancer and other diseases, map groundwater sources, test the integrity of mechanical structures, and measure soil density for construction projects.

Types of radioactive sources

Radioactive sources may contain a wide range of different radionuclides and radioactive materials in varying quantities.

Sealed Source: A radioactive source in which the radioactive material is a) sealed in a permanent capsule or b) is in a chemically bound phase and in a solid state. The radioactive material is sealed or placed in bound form in a capsule that is strong enough to prevent leakage but still allows ionizing radiation to pass through, allowing it to be used in a controlled manner. Concentrated radioactive material is typically supplied in small volume sealed sources – ranging in size from a few millimeters to a few centimeters. Sealed sources can be used in teletherapy machines used to treat cancer, as well as in laboratory equipment such as gas chromatographs, liquid scintillation counters and analytical balances.
Open Source: A radioactive source in which the radioactive material a) is not sealed in a permanent capsule or b) is not in bound form and in a solid state. These types of sources, which can be in the form of powder, liquid or gas, are used in biological research and medicine. In radiotherapy for cancer treatment, ultra-small amounts of open sources are introduced into the body by injection or ingestion to expose specific areas, organs or tissues to radiation. In industry, open sources are used as a radioactive tracer to detect leaks.
Disused source: A radioactive source no longer in use or intended for use in the practice for which official approval was obtained.
Orphan source: A radioactive source that is not under regulatory control because it was either never under regulatory control for various historical and economic reasons, or was abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen, or transferred without proper official authorization. Previously, there have already been situations where, due to such sources, there were accidents involving radiation exposure.

Safety and security of radioactive sources

Concerns about accidental exposures, including in the metal processing and metallurgy industries and from deliberate unauthorized acts involving radioactive sources, led the IAEA Board of Governors to approve the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) in 2003. The Code of Conduct, along with its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources, is a non-binding document that helps countries develop and harmonize policies, laws, and regulations on the safety and security of radioactive sources. Each country is responsible for the regulatory control of radioactive sources, from their initial production to their final disposal.

The purpose of the Code is to help countries reduce the likelihood of accidental exposure to radioactive sources or the malicious use of such sources to cause harm. The Code aims to prevent unauthorized access to or damage to radioactive sources, as well as their loss, theft, or unauthorized transfer.

How to recognize a radioactive source?

The ionizing radiation symbol indicates the presence of ionizing radiation and identifies radioactive sources.

Most radioactive sources are used and housed within larger equipment protected by a powerful shield. Devices or containers containing radioactive sources are typically marked worldwide with a black, purple, or yellow trefoil symbol, or the words "radiation" or "radioactive."

Radioactive sources can look quite harmless—like small metal objects. Examples of radioactive sources can be found here. To confirm the radioactivity of a particular object, radiation detection devices are used.

What should you do if you discover a radioactive source?

Avoid approaching or touching objects marked "radiation." Immediately contact authorities, such as the police. If you feel unwell, seek medical attention immediately and inform them that you were near a potential radiation source. Radiation injuries may look like burns, but unlike burns, they do not heal. Symptoms of radiation overexposure include nausea, diarrhea, and vomiting.

What role does the IAEA play?

Radioactive sources are used in virtually every country in the world. The radiation they emit serves many beneficial purposes in medicine, industry, and agriculture. However, if sources are not properly controlled, they pose a threat to human health and the environment. The IAEA helps countries develop effective, safe, and reliable systems for monitoring their radioactive sources throughout their entire life cycle.

The IAEA provides access to communications and information systems, offers training and information exchange services, and expertise, including comprehensive regulatory assessment services, and helps implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supporting guidance.
The IAEA Incidents and Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) contains information on lost or stolen nuclear or other radioactive sources. The range of such data is very wide – from the smuggling and sale of nuclear materials to their unauthorized disposal and detection of lost radioactive substances. Previously, there have been situations where accidents related to radiation exposure occurred due to such sources. The IAEA publishes standards, recommendations and guidance on the safety and security of radioactive sources in the relevant IAEA Safety Standards Series and Nuclear Security Series.
The IAEA assists countries in implementing standards, recommendations and guidance, working in coordination with other bilateral or multilateral initiatives.
The IAEA assists countries in managing disused sealed radioactive sources by providing reference materials and technical guidance, e-learning services, hands-on training and expertise in the safe management of disused radioactive sources.
In addition, the IAEA helps countries implement safe and cost-effective technologies for retrieving, conditioning and storing radioactive sources.

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Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source. It represents an accurate account of the source's assertions and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency –

An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

Ukraine's Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost connection to one of its two off-site power lines on Tuesday, leaving it once again precariously reliant on a single power source, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The 330 kilovolt (kV) Ferosplavna-1 off-site power line was disconnected around midday on February 10, allegedly due to military activity near the switchyard operated by the Zaporizhzhya Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP). ZNPP is still powered by the 750 kV Dniprovska off-site power line to ensure nuclear safety functions. Before the conflict, the ZNPP had four 750 kV and six 330 kV power lines available.

Around the time the Ferosplavna-1 line was disconnected, the IAEA team at the ZNPP heard explosions in the distance. They have not had access to the ZTPP switchyard in several years but were informed that lines connecting the switchyard to the ZNPP have been damaged. One of these lines was damaged in December 2025 and subsequently repaired under thelocal ceasefire brokered by the IAEA. The team has yet to be informed of an anticipated timeline for repairs; however, the IAEA stands ready to negotiate another ceasefire to facilitate repairs to these essential power lines to ensure the nuclear safety of the plant.

The situation also caused damage to the heating pipe from the ZNPP to the nearby city of Enerhodar, which caused the city to lose heating for several hours.

Military activity over the past weekend once again targeted the Ukrainian electrical grid, impacting nuclear power plants' (NPPs) operations. All reactor units across Ukraine, except for one, had to reduce power, and several off-site power lines were disconnected. One reactor unit was disconnected from the grid, while another was shut down due to equipment issues from electrical fluctuations. All Ukrainian NPPs reported multiple drones and a cruise missile within their monitoring areas, and the IAEA team at the Khmelnitsky NPP also heard military activity and sheltered.

“Such events in Ukraine are becoming all too common with each one reminding us of the ever-present risks to nuclear safety and security arising from deteriorating grid conditions,” Director General Grossi said. “No one benefits from a nuclear accident – especially one that can be prevented from all of us taking action. To this end, I call for maximum military restraint from all sides.”

The IAEA's mission to electrical substances critical to nuclear safety and security in Ukraine continued this week. As a result of the ongoing military activity described above, two additional substances were added to the mission, bringing the total number of substance visits by IAEA teams to 12. However, today, the team visiting a substance in Western Ukraine was forced to evacuate due to local air raid alarms. At the same time, teams at both the Khmelnitsky and Rivne NPPs were also required to shelter in place.

“We are lucky to be able to leverage our staff already deployed across Ukraine to obtain valuable first-hand knowledge of the impact these attacks are having on nuclear safety and security. We will continue to report on the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine according to theSeven Indispensable Pillars and bring timely and important in situ information to our Member States,” Director General Grossi stated.

Earlier this week, the IAEA teams at the Rivne and Chornobyl NPPs safely rotated.

The Agency continued with deliveries under the comprehensive program of assistance to help Ukraine maintain nuclear safety and security amid the on-going conflict. Three new systems to complement available physical protection measures were recently delivered – one to the Centralized Dry Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility of the State Enterprise “National Nuclear Energy Generating Company Energoatom” and two to the State Specialized Enterprise “Central Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management”. One high-pressure air compressor with a filling panel was delivered to Rivne NPP.

Additionally, one real-time PCR cycler was delivered to the Odesa Regional State Laboratory to support PCR diagnostics for fast and accurate detection of diseases. Laboratory supplies and consumables, including biological reference material, IT and laboratory equipment were delivered to the Zaporizhzhya Regional State Laboratory.

The deliveries, which brought the total number of shipments to Ukraine to 203, were made possible with funds from Denmark, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom.

Please note: This information is raw content obtained directly from the source. It represents an accurate account of the source's assertions and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.