Category: Транспорт

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: KMZ Cargo – KMZ CARGO –

An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

EASA closes skies to 12 countries, 170 container ships are blocked in Hormuz, Jebel Ali is out of service, and CMA CGM imposes a $3,000 per FEU levy.

The escalation of the military conflict in the Middle East, triggered by Operation Epic Fury and Iran's retaliatory strikes, paralyzed civil aviation and brought key container ports in the Persian Gulf to a standstill. By the end of March 1, 2026, the region had effectively fallen out of global transport patterns, leading to an immediate reduction in capacity, rising freight rates, and a reorganization of routes for both sea and air cargo flows, according to publications such as Trasporto Europa, Freight Waves, and Lloydslist.com.

According to a bulletin from the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European regulator recommended that airlines avoid the airspace of 12 countries, including Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and northern Saudi Arabia. The document points to the high risks posed by air defense systems, missiles, and drones, which pose a threat to aircraft even at cruising altitudes, as well as the impossibility of reliably separating and identifying targets.

According to national aviation authority notices, Tehran's airspace is closed until at least 8:30 AM on March 3. Israel has also restricted overflights for civilian aircraft without special permits until 10:00 AM on March 3. In the UAE, according to notices, a "special control" regime is in effect, directly affecting operations at Dubai and Abu Dhabi airports.

Electronic warfare is a factor that greatly increases operational risks. Reports of interference with satellite navigation systems, including jamming and signal spoofing, are widespread on certain routes. This potentially impacts navigation, flight profile management, and crew workload, forcing airlines to abandon corridors that appear open on paper.

Airlines responded immediately to the threats. Emirates suspended all flights to and from Dubai. Etihad announced an emergency suspension of flights. Qatar Airways ceased service due to the closure of national airspace, instituting a diversion and refund policy. In Europe, Lufthansa Group, Air France, and British Airways expanded their list of cancelled destinations, banning overflights of Iran, Iraq, and Israel. Italy's ITA Airways, according to the company, extended the suspension of flights to Tel Aviv until March 7 and rerouted flights to avoid the airspace of Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Iran.

The network effects of these decisions are already evident: flights are being rerouted to alternative Eastern Mediterranean hubs, requiring aircraft and crew redeployment, with cascading consequences for cargo aircraft schedules and rotations.

The situation in the maritime industry is unfolding along similar lines. According to Lloyd's List, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), CMA CGM, and Hapag-Lloyd have officially announced the suspension of transit and ordered vessels in the conflict zone to take shelter. Other shipping lines are expected to follow suit in the coming hours.

MSC announced that it has suspended all bookings for cargo bound for the Middle East until further notice. CMA CGM has introduced a "conflict-related emergency surcharge": according to the operator's notice, the charge will be $2,000 per 20-foot container, $3,000 per 40-foot container, and $4,000 per reefer container for shipments to ports in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

According to estimates by Hua Joo Tan, co-founder of Linerlytica, approximately 170 container ships with a combined capacity of approximately 450,000 TEUs (approximately 1.4% of the global fleet) are currently trapped inside the Strait of Hormuz. Reuters data confirms that hundreds of commercial vessels remain anchored on both sides of the strait.

According to Lloyd's List Intelligence, at least 15 container ships turned around while attempting to enter or exit the strait. Iran has not officially announced a closure of the strait, but warnings from Iranian radio stations, military threats, and internal directives from shipping companies have effectively halted traffic.

The situation at the region's ports is uneven. According to maritime industry sources, the most critical impact is being recorded in the UAE. Operations at the largest container hub, Jebel Ali (Dubai), have been suspended. Dubai authorities confirmed that a fire broke out within the port following the interception of an aerial target. According to sources, the port is not officially closed, but operations are effectively suspended. The closure of such a major facility, as analysis shows, dramatically reduces transshipment and regional distribution capacity, which immediately impacts feeder shipments to other Persian Gulf ports.

The Port of Sharjah in the UAE is operating normally. The ports of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan, located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, are operating at full capacity. However, their regional transshipment capacity is significantly lower than that of Jebel Ali, creating the risk of overload and increased waiting times.

In Oman, the Port of Duqm, including the Asyad dry dock, has suspended operations. The ports of Sohar and Salalah remain open. Analysts note that Salalah maintains its role as a hub on Arabian-Asia routes, which is critical for connectivity to Asian and African markets.

All ports in Kuwait are officially open, but the Kuwait Ports Authority has ordered the rerouting of vessels bound for Shuaiba to the port of Shuwaikh, which operates with a draft limit of 9.6 meters and complies with ISPS 2 safety standards. Manifests, according to the authorities, are transmitted automatically. This decision concentrates traffic in one terminal, creating the risk of congestion and slowing cargo handling.

In Qatar, the ports of Hamad, Doha, Ras Laffan, and others are open, but captains report deteriorating GPS signals, leading to the need to exercise extreme caution when navigating. In Bahrain, Wilhelmsen reports that operations at Khalifa bin Salman Port have been suspended, as have all port control operations, except for emergency ones, at Sitra. In Jordan, the port of Aqaba is fully operational, according to ISS Shipping, remaining one of the few ports in the Levant not directly affected by restrictions.

The current crisis is also exacerbating the situation on the alternative route – the Red Sea. As Peter Sand, chief analyst at Xeneta, notes, hopes for a mass return of container shipping to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal in 2026 appear to have been dashed. According to the Associated Press, Yemen's Houthis have declared their readiness to resume attacks on commercial vessels.

Shipping companies have already begun adjusting routes. Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd notified customers of the rerouting of the MECL (to the US) and ME11 (to Northern Europe) services, linking the Middle East and India, from the Suez route to the Cape of Good Hope. Gemini Cooperation, which includes Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd, cited "unforeseen constraints arising from the overall operational situation in the Red Sea region." Earlier, in February, some lines began returning to transit via the Suez, but a new round of tensions halted this process.

Analysts explain that the extended sailing distance around the Cape of Good Hope currently absorbs approximately 2.5 million TEU of global container capacity. A return to the Suez route would free up this volume and potentially lead to a rate collapse. Xeneta forecasts that rates will now continue to decline, but at a much slower pace than expected in the second half of the year. Meanwhile, Peter Sand notes that spot rates from Asia have already begun to rise since February 15 amid the US military buildup in the region.

For the air cargo market, the primary impact was a sharp reduction in available capacity. According to monitoring data, capacity fell by 100% in Iran and Syria, by 84% in Iraq, and by 78% in Israel. Even in Lebanon and Jordan, where capacity has not been completely reduced, the reductions are significant. Globally, market participants report that total cargo aircraft capacity has fallen by 2% in a week. This figure, experts point out, is particularly significant given that after 2022, the Middle East and Iranian corridors have become the key alternative to Russia's closed skies.

The disruption of hubs in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha is disrupting established logistics networks. These airports served as key consolidation and transfer points for traffic between Asia, Europe, and North America. Losing access to these hubs forces carriers to use longer routes, which increases travel time and fuel consumption. Experts estimate that each additional flight hour costs airlines $6,000-$10,000, including fuel and crew costs, not including overflight fees and indirect costs.

Additional pressure is creating a "forced" demand for air freight as a substitute for sea freight. In the Strait of Hormuz, in addition to container ships, insurance and operational issues are hampering tanker operators. At the same time, the structural bypass of the Red Sea via the Cape of Good Hope continues to increase transit times between Asia and Europe by 15-20 days, pushing shippers of time-critical cargo to switch to air freight.

Supply chains with stringent deadline and temperature requirements have been hit the hardest. Air freight rates for pharmaceuticals are expected to increase by 20-30% compared to the end of 2024. For electronics and AI components, delivery times are increasing and connections are becoming less predictable. For e-commerce, sources in the freight industry report that reduced cargo capacity and the prioritization of critical cargo are limiting the acceptance of standard shipments and increasing rates.

In addition to operating costs, insurance costs are rising. According to market data, war risk insurance premiums have increased from 0.125% to 0.25-0.5% of the cargo value, and even higher on some routes due to special surcharges. Notification periods for changes in conditions have been reduced from 48 to 24 hours, increasing uncertainty for shippers during planning.

As a reminder, in June 2025, Iran shifted its tactics in confronting the West, moving from direct seizures of tankers to large-scale jamming of navigation signals in the Strait of Hormuz. At that time, according to Windward Maritime AI, as the conflict with Israel escalated, more than a thousand vessels experienced coordinate distortion daily. LR

Read more:http://logirus.ru/nevs/global_logistics/middle_east_on_fire_conflict_paralyzed_1-4_world_fleet_and_collapsed_air traffic.html

Publication date: 03/02/2026

Please note; this information is raw content obtained directly from the information source. It is an accurate account of what the source claims, and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: KMZ Cargo – KMZ CARGO –

An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

Specialists from the KMZ Cargo company (part of the military-industrial holding Kinigsepp Machine-Building Plant) in their work, they often encounter discrepancies between the declared and actual weight or size of shipments. In some cases, this issue can be resolved without hassle, but not in air freight, where every gram and centimeter is counted and the accuracy of these measurements is paramount.

When a client requests shipment of cargo with specific dimensions and weight, these parameters are reserved and assigned to a specific flight. One of the most common errors in these requests is weighing and measuring without taking into account the packaging, pallet, or crate.

Unplanned increases in cargo parameters lead to additional costs and potential issues with shipping on the selected flight. Sometimes it's possible to reschedule the request, but airlines often refuse to accept the cargo due to insufficient space on board. Alternative flights or dates must then be found, which can lead to delays or even failure to deliver the cargo on schedule.

To avoid such situations, KMZ Cargo specialists recommend:

• Carefully weigh the cargo and indicate the exact weight and dimensions;

• Consider possible additional weight – packaging, protective materials, etc.;

• Plan for time reserves and be prepared for possible delays when recalculating weight.

Properly specifying your cargo's characteristics will help avoid unexpected complications and make the shipping process transparent and as fast as possible. Contact the professionals at KMZ Cargo, and your cargo will arrive on time!

Publication date: 02/27/2026

Please note; this information is raw content obtained directly from the information source. It is an accurate account of what the source claims, and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

Translation. Region: Russian Federation –

Source: KMZ Cargo – KMZ CARGO –

An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

Employers were prohibited from including overtime in their schedules, and drivers were allowed to split their breaks into 15-minute segments.

The Russian Ministry of Transport has presented a draft new order (source) regulating drivers' work and rest schedules. The document is scheduled to come into effect on September 1, 2026, and will remain in effect until September 1, 2032. In the draft, the ministry adjusted the rules for summarizing working hours, clarified daily rest periods, and expanded the list of exceptions for certain categories of transportation.

These requirements apply to all drivers employed under an employment contract and their employers—both legal entities and sole proprietors. The document is mandatory for use when developing internal work regulations and creating shift schedules.

The new rules do not apply to drivers engaged in international transportation, fire trucks, ambulances, emergency rescue services, and departmental security drivers. Exceptions are also made for drivers employed by state and local government agencies, employees working on a rotational basis, and military drivers on active duty.

The document stipulates that a driver's normal workweek cannot exceed 40 hours. If it is impossible to comply with the daily or weekly limit, the employer is required to implement a summarized work time accounting system. The accounting period may be monthly, quarterly, or other, but no longer than one year.

When calculated in aggregate, the daily shift duration must not exceed 10 hours. A shift extension of no more than two hours is permitted, but only to complete a transport or travel to a parking spot and subject to rest requirements. Certain categories of drivers—drivers of healthcare facilities, public utilities, emergency services, passenger taxis, cash-in-transit vehicles, and executive cars—are permitted to work shifts of up to 12 hours. For drivers of regular city and suburban routes, a 12-hour shift is only possible with the approval of a trade union or other representative body of drivers.

The draft provides for the possibility of dividing the workday into two parts. The break between the parts must occur no later than five hours after the start of work. The total duration of such breaks cannot exceed five hours, and for drivers of regular passenger transportation in the city and suburbs, three hours. The location of the break must be free for the driver to use at their own discretion, and the break itself is not included in working hours.

For drivers of passenger cars (except taxis) and employees engaged in geological exploration and survey work in the field, irregular working hours may be established.

According to paragraph 8 of the document, driving time during a daily period must not exceed nine hours. This limit can be increased to 10 hours no more than twice per calendar week. To complete a trip or travel to a parking lot, drivers are entitled to exceed the established time by a maximum of two hours; however, employers are prohibited from including such excess driving time in their schedules.

No later than 4:30 hours after the start of travel, drivers must take a special break of at least 45 minutes. This break can be split into sections: the first part should be no less than 15 minutes, and the last part should be no less than 30 minutes. For drivers of regular city transportation, each part of the break must be at least 10 minutes.

Daily rest must be no less than twice the duration of the previous shift. When calculated cumulatively, the minimum rest is 11 hours within 24 hours from the start of the shift. Rest may be reduced to nine hours no more than three times between weekly rest periods, and may also be divided into parts, provided the first part is at least three hours long and the last part is at least nine hours long.

Drivers working as part of a crew are required to take a minimum of nine hours of rest at the same time. Time spent on a trip but not driving is not included in working hours. For these hours, the employer is required to pay additional compensation, the amount of which is determined by a collective agreement or local regulation, taking into account the opinion of the drivers' representative body.

Weekly uninterrupted rest must be at least 45 hours. It must be provided before the seventh working day following the end of the previous weekly rest.

As a reminder, back in 2021, there was talk about the Ministry of Transport intending to monitor truck drivers who fall asleep at the wheel using systems capable of detecting a person's fatigue using pupil size or heart rate. At the time, it was planned that drivers of vehicles equipped with similar "Antisleep" systems would be able to spend more than the prescribed 10-12 hours behind the wheel. The cost of installing such equipment at the time was estimated at between 25,000 and 85,000 rubles. LR

Read more:http://logirus.ru/nevs/transport/new_regulations_of the Ministry of Transport_from_1_September_2026_drivers_will_work_and_rest_otherwise.html

Publication date: 02/25/2026

Please note; this information is raw content obtained directly from the information source. It is an accurate account of what the source claims, and does not necessarily reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.